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Abstract
This encyclopedic article gives a mini-introduction into the theory of uni-
versal learning, founded by Ray Solomonoff in the 1960s and significantly
developed and extended in the last decade. It explains the spirit of universal
learning, but necessarily glosses over technical subtleties.
Contents
1 Definition, Motivation and Background 2
2 Deterministic Environments 2
3 Algorithmic Probability 3
4 Universal Bayes 5
5 Applications 7
6 Discussion and Future Directions 11
Recommended Reading 12
Keywords
Algorithmic probability; Ray Solomonoff; induction; prediction; decision; ac-
tion; Turing machine; Kolmogorov complexity; universal prior; Bayes’ rule.
1
1 Definition, Motivation and Background
Universal (machine) learning is concerned with the development and study of algo-
rithms that are able to learn from data in a very large range of environments with as
few assumptions as possible. The class of environments typically considered includes
all computable stochastic processes. The investigated learning tasks range from in-
ductive inference, sequence prediction, sequential decisions, to (re)active problems
like reinforcement learning [Hut05], but also include clustering, regression, and oth-
ers [LV08]. Despite various no-free-lunch theorems [WM97], universal learning is
possible by assuming that the data possess some effective structure, but without
specifying any further, which structure. Learning algorithms that are universal (at
least to some degree) are also necessary for developing autonomous general intelli-
gent systems, required e.g. for exploring other planets, as opposed to decision sup-
port systems which keep a human in the loop. There is also an intrinsic interest in
striving for generality: Finding new learning algorithms for every particular (new)
problem is possible but cumbersome and prone to disagreement or contradiction.
A sound formal general and ideally complete theory of learning can unify existing
approaches, guide the development of practical learning algorithms, and last but
not least lead to novel and deep insights.
This encyclopedic article gives a mini-introduction into the theory of universal
learning, founded by Ray Solomonoff in the 1960s [Sol64, Sol78] and significantly
developed and extended by the author and his colleagues in the last decade. It is
based on [Hut05]. It explains the spirit of universal learning, but necessarily glosses
over many technical subtleties. Precise formulation of the results with proofs and/or
references to original publications can be found in [Hut05].
2 Deterministic Environments
Let t,n∈IN be natural numbers, X ∗ be the set of finite strings and X∞ be the set
of infinite sequences over some alphabet X of size |X |. For a string x∈X ∗ of length
ℓ(x)=n we write x1x2...xn with xt∈X , and further abbreviate xt:n :=xtxt+1...xn−1xn
and x<n :=x1...xn−1, and ǫ=x<1 for the empty string. Consider a countable class
of hypotheses M= {H1,H2,...}. Each hypothesis H ∈M (also called model) shall
describe an infinite sequence xH1:∞, e.g. like in IQ test questions “2,4,6,8,....”. In
online learning, for t=1,2,3,..., we predict xt based on past observations x˙<t, then
nature reveals x˙t, and so on, where the dot above x indicates the true observation.
We assume that the true hypothesis is in M, i.e. x˙1:∞=x
Hm
1:∞ for some m∈IN . Goal
is to (“quickly”) identify the unknown Hm from the observations.
Learning by enumeration works as follows: Let Mt = {H ∈M : x
H
<t = x˙<t} be
the set of hypotheses consistent with our observations x˙<t so far. The hypothesis
in Mt with smallest index, say m
′
t, is selected and used for predicting xt. Then x˙t
is observed and all H ∈Mt inconsistent with xt are eliminated, i.e. they are not
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included in Mt+1. Every prediction error results in the elimination of at least Hm′t ,
so after at most m−1 errors, the true hypothesis Hm gets selected forever, since it
never makes an error (Hm ∈Mt ∀t). This identification may take arbitrarily long
(in t), but the number of errors on the way is bounded by m−1, and the latter is
often more important. As an example for which the bound is attained, consider Hi
with xHi1:∞ := 1
f(i)0∞ ∀i for any strictly increasing function f , e.g. f(i)= i. But we
now show that we can do much better than this, at least for finite X .
Majority learning. Consider (temporarily in this paragraph only) a binary alpha-
bet X ={0,1} and a finite deterministic hypothesis class M={H1,H2,...,HN}. Hm
and Mt are as before, but now we take a majority vote among the hypotheses in
Mt as our prediction of xt. If the prediction turns out to be wrong, then at least
half (the majority) of the hypotheses get eliminated from Mt. Hence after at most
logN errors, there is only a single hypothesis, namely Hm, left over. So this majority
predictor makes at most logN errors. As an example where this bound is essentially
attained, consider m=N =2n−1 and let xHi1:∞ be the digits after the comma of the
binary expansion of (i−1)/2n for i=1,...,N .
Weighted majority for countable classes. Majority learning can be adapted to
denumerable classes M and general finite alphabet X as follows: Each hypothesis
Hi is assigned a weight wi> 0 with
∑
iwi≤ 1. Let W :=
∑
i:Hi∈Mt
wi be the total
weight of the hypotheses in Mt. Let M
a
t := {Hi ∈Mt : x
Hi
t = a} be the consistent
hypotheses predicting xt=a, and Wa their weight, and take the weighted majority
prediction xt=argmaxaWa. Similarly as above, a prediction error decreases W by
a factor of 1−1/|X |, since maxaWa≥W/|X |. Since wm≤W ≤1, this algorithm can
at most make log1−1/|X |wm=O(logw
−1
m ) prediction errors. If we choose for instance
wi=(i+1)
−2, the number of errors is O(logm), which is an exponential improvement
over the Gold-style learning by enumeration above.
3 Algorithmic Probability
Algorithmic probability has been founded by Solomonoff [Sol64]. The so-called uni-
versal probability or a-priori probability is the key quantity for universal learning.
Its philosophical and technical roots are Ockham’s razor (choose the simplest model
consistent with the data), Epicurus’ principle of multiple explanations (keep all
explanations consistent with the data), (Universal) Turing machines (to compute,
quantify and assign codes to all quantities of interest), and Kolmogorov complexity
(to define what simplicity/complexity means). This section considers determinis-
tic computable sequences, and the next section the general setup of computable
probability distributions.
(Universal) monotone Turing machines. Since we consider infinite computable
sequences, we need devices that convert input data streams to output data streams.
For this we define the following variants of a classical deterministic Turing Machine:
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Amonotone Turing machine T is defined as a Turing machine with one unidirectional
input tape, one unidirectional output tape, and some bidirectional work tapes. The
input tape is binary (no blank) and read only, the output tape is over finite alphabet
X (no blank) and write only, unidirectional tapes are those where the head can only
move from left to right, work tapes are initially filled with zeros and the output
tape with some fixed element from X . We say that monotone Turing machine T
outputs/computes a string starting with x on input p, and write T (p) =x∗ if p is
to the left of the input head when the last bit of x is output (T reads all of p but
no more). T may continue operation and need not halt. For a given x, the set
of such p forms a prefix code. Such codes are called minimal programs. Similarly
we write T (p)=ω if p outputs the infinite sequence ω. A prefix code P is a set of
binary strings such that no element is proper prefix of another. It satisfies Kraft’s
inequality
∑
p∈P2
−ℓ(p)≤1.
The table of rules of a Turing machine T can be prefix encoded in a canonical way
as a binary string, denoted by 〈T 〉. Hence, the set of Turing machines {T1,T2,...} can
be effectively enumerated. There are so-called universal Turing machines that can
“simulate” all other Turing machines. We define a particular one which simulates
monotone Turing machine T (q) if fed with input 〈T 〉q, i.e. U(〈T 〉q) = T (q) ∀T,q.
Note that for p not of the form 〈T 〉q, U(p) does not output anything. We call this
particular U the reference universal Turing machine.
Universal weighted majority learning. T1(ǫ),T2(ǫ),... constitutes an effective
enumeration of all finite and infinite computable sequences, hence also monotone
U(p) for p∈{0,1}∗. As argued below, the class of computable infinite sequences, is
conceptually very interesting. The halting problem implies that there is no recursive
enumeration of all partial-recursive functions with infinite domain; hence we cannot
remove the finite sequences algorithmically. It is very fortunate that we don’t have
to. Hypothesis Hp is identified with the sequence U(p), which may be finite, infinite,
or possibly even empty. The class of considered hypotheses isM :={Hp :p∈{0,1}
∗}.
The weighted majority algorithm also needs weights wp for each Hp. Ockham’s
razor combined with Epicurus’ principle demand to assign a high (low) prior weight
to a simple (complex) hypothesis. If complexity is identified with program length,
then wp should be a decreasing function of ℓ(p). It turns out that wp = 2
−ℓ(p) is
the “right” choice, since minimal p form a prefix code and therefore
∑
pwp≤ 1 as
required.
Using Hp for prediction can now fail in two ways. Hp may make a wrong pre-
diction or no prediction at all for xt. The true hypothesis Hm is still assumed
to produce an infinite sequence. The weighted majority algorithm in this setting
makes at most O(logw−1p )=O(ℓ(p)) errors. It is also plausible that learning ℓ(p) bits
requires O(ℓ(p)) “trials”.
Universal mixture prediction. Solomonoff [Sol78] defined the following universal
a-priori probability
M(x) :=
∑
p:U(p)=x∗
2−ℓ(p) (1)
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That is, M(x)=W is the total weight of the computable deterministic hypotheses
consistent with x for the universal weight choice wp=2
−ℓ(p). The universal weighted
majority algorithm predicted argmaxaM(x˙<ta). Instead, one could also make a
probability prediction M(a|x˙<t) :=M(x˙<ta)/M(x˙<t), which is the relative weight of
hypotheses in Mt predicting a. The higher the probability M(x˙t|x˙<t) assigned to
the true next observation x˙t, the better. Consider the absolute prediction error |1−
M(x˙t|x˙<t)| and the logarithmic error −logM(x˙t|x˙<t). The cumulative logarithmic
error is bounded by
∑n
t=1−logM(x˙t|x˙<t) =−logM(x˙1:n)≤ ℓ(p) for any program p
that prints x˙∗. For instance p could be chosen as the shortest one printing x˙1:∞,
which has length Km(x˙1:∞) := min{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x˙1:∞}. Using 1−z ≤ −logz and
letting n→∞ we get
∞∑
t=1
|1−M(x˙t|x˙<t)| ≤
∞∑
t=1
− logM(x˙t|x˙<t) ≤ Km(x˙1:∞)
Hence again, the cumulative absolute and logarithmic errors are bounded by the
number of bits required to describe the true environment.
4 Universal Bayes
The exposition so far has dealt with deterministic environments only. Data se-
quences produced by real-world processes are rarely as clean as IQ test sequences.
They are often noisy. This section deals with stochastic sequences sampled from
computable probability distributions. The developed theory can be regarded as
an instantiation of Bayesian learning. Bayes’ theorem allows to update beliefs in
face of new information but is mute about how to choose the prior and the model
class to begin with. Subjective choices based on prior knowledge are informal, and
traditional ‘objective’ choices like Jeffrey’s prior are not universal. Machine learn-
ing, the computer science branch of statistics, develops (fully) automatic inference
and decision algorithms for very large problems. Naturally, machine learning has
(re)discovered and exploited different principles (Ockham’s and Epicurus’) for choos-
ing priors, appropriate for this situation. This leads to an alternative representation
of universal probability as a mixture over all lower semi-computable semimeasures
with Kolmogorov complexity based prior as described below.
Bayes. Sequences ω = ω1:∞ ∈ X
∞ are now assumed to be sampled from the
“true” probability measure µ, i.e. µ(x1:n) := P[ω1:n = x1:n|µ] is the µ-probability
that ω starts with x1:n. Expectations w.r.t. µ are denoted by E. In particu-
lar for a function f : X n → IR, we have E[f ] = E[f(ω1:n)] =
∑
x1:n
µ(x1:n)f(x1:n).
Note that in Bayesian learning, measures, environments, and models are the
same objects; let M= {ν1,ν2,...}≡ {Hν1,Hν2 ,...} denote a countable class of these
measures≡hypotheses. Assume that µ is unknown but known to be a member of
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M, and wν :=P[Hν ] is the given prior belief in Hν . Then the Bayes mixture
ξ(x1:n) := P[ω1:n = x1:n] =
∑
ν∈M
P[ω1:n = x1:n|Hν ]P[Hν ] ≡
∑
ν∈M
ν(x1:n)wν
must be our a-priori belief in x1:n, and P[Hν |ω1:n=x1:n]=wνν(x1:n)/ξ(x1:n) be our
posterior belief in ν by Bayes’ rule.
Universal choice of M. Next we need to find a universal class of environments
MU . Roughly speaking, Bayes works if M contains the true environment µ. The
largerM the less restrictive is this assumption. The class of all computable distribu-
tions, although only countable, is pretty large from a practical point of view, since it
includes for instance all of today’s valid physics theories. (Finding a non-computable
physical system would indeed overturn the generally accepted Church-Turing the-
sis.) It is the largest class, relevant from a computational point of view. Solomonoff
[Sol64, Eq.(13)] defined and studied the mixture over this class.
One problem is that this class is not (effectively=recursively) enumerable, since
the class of computable functions is not enumerable due to the halting problem, nor
is it decidable whether a function is a measure. Hence ξ is completely incomputable.
Leonid Levin [ZL70] had the idea to “slightly” extend the class and include also lower
semi-computable semimeasures.
A function ν :X ∗→ [0,1] is a called a semimeasure iff ν(x)≥
∑
a∈X ν(xa) ∀x∈X
∗.
It is a proper probability measure iff equality holds and ν(ǫ)=1. ν(x) still denotes
the ν-probability that a sequence starts with string x. A function is called lower
semi-computable, if it can be approximated from below. Similarly to that fact that
the class of partial recursive functions is recursively enumerable, one can show that
the class MU = {ν1,ν2,...} of lower semi-computable semimeasures is recursively
enumerable. In some sense MU is the largest class of environments for which ξ is
in some sense computable, but even larger classes are possible [Sch02].
Kolmogorov complexity. Before we can turn to the prior wν, we need to quantify
complexity/simplicity. Intuitively, a string is simple if it can be described in a few
words, like “the string of one million ones”, and is complex if there is no such short
description, like for a random object whose shortest description is specifying it bit
by bit. We are interested in effective descriptions, and hence restrict decoders to be
Turing machines. One can define the prefix Kolmogorov complexity of string x as
the length ℓ of the shortest halting program p for which U outputs x:
K(x) := min
p
{ℓ(p) : U(p) = x halts}
Simple strings like 000...0 can be generated by short programs, and, hence have low
Kolmogorov complexity, but irregular (e.g. random) strings are their own shortest
description, and hence have high Kolmogorov complexity. For non-string objects
o (like numbers and functions) one defines K(o) :=K(〈o〉), where 〈o〉∈X ∗ is some
standard code for o. In particular, K(νi)=K(i).
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To be brief, K is an excellent universal complexity measure, suitable for quanti-
fying Ockham’s razor.
The universal prior. We can now quantify a prior biased towards simple models.
First, we quantify the complexity of an environment ν or hypothesis Hν by its
Kolmogorov complexity K(ν). The universal prior should be a decreasing function
in the model’s complexity, and of course sum to (less than) one. Since
∑
x2
−K(x)≤1
by the prefix property and Kraft’s inequality, this suggests the choice
wν = w
U
ν := 2
−K(ν) (2)
Since logi≤K(νi)≤ logi+2loglogi for “most” i, most νi have prior approximately
reciprocal to their index i as also advocated by Jeffreys and Rissanen.
Representations. Combining the universal class MU with the universal prior (2),
we arrive at the universal mixture
ξU(x) :=
∑
ν∈MU
2−K(ν)ν(x) (3)
which has remarkable properties. First, it is itself a lower semi-computable semimea-
sure, that is ξU ∈MU , which is very convenient. Note that for most classes, ξ 6∈M.
Second, ξU coincides with M within an irrelevant multiplicative constant, and
M ∈MU . This means that the mixture over deterministic computable sequences is
as rich as the mixture over the much larger class of semi-computable semimeasures.
The intuitive reason is that the probabilistic semimeasures are in the convex hull
of the deterministic ones, and therefore need not be taken extra into account in the
mixture.
There is another, possibly the simplest, representation: One can show thatM(x)
is equal to the probability that U outputs a string starting with x when provided
with uniform random noise on the program tape. Note that a uniform distribution
is also used in many no-free-lunch theorems to prove the impossibility of universal
learners, but in our case the uniform distribution is piped through a universal Turing
machine, which defeats these negative implications as we will see in the next section.
5 Applications
In the stochastic case, identification of the true hypothesis is problematic. The
posterior P[H|x] may not concentrate around the true hypothesis Hµ if there are
other hypotheses Hν that are not asymptotically distinguishable from Hµ. But even
if model identification (induction in the narrow sense) fails, predictions, decisions,
and actions can be good, and indeed, for universal learning this is generally the case.
Universal sequence prediction. Given a sequence x1x2...xt−1, we want to predict
its likely continuation xt. We assume that the strings which have to be continued
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are drawn from a computable “true” probability distribution µ. The maximal prior
information a prediction algorithm can possess is the exact knowledge of µ, but often
the true distribution is unknown. Instead, prediction is based on a guess ρ of µ. Let
ρ(a|x):=ρ(xa)/ρ(x) be the “predictive” ρ-probability that the next symbol is a∈X ,
given sequence x∈X ∗. Since µ∈MU it is natural to use ξU or M for prediction.
Solomonoff’s [Sol78, Hut05] celebrated result indeed shows that M converges to
µ. For general alphabet it reads
∞∑
t=1
E
[∑
a∈X
(
M(a|ω<t)− µ(a|ω<t)
)2]
≤ K(µ) ln 2 +O(1) (4)
Analogous bounds hold for ξU and for other than the Euclidian distance, e.g. the
Hellinger and the absolute distance and the relative entropy.
For a sequence a1,a2,... of random variables,
∑∞
t=1E[a
2
t ]≤ c<∞ implies at→ 0
for t→∞ with µ-probability 1 (w.p.1). Convergence is rapid in the sense that the
probability that a2t exceeds ε> 0 at more than c/εδ times, is bounded by δ. This
might loosely be called the number of errors. Hence Solomonoff’s bounds implies
M(xt|ω<t)− µ(xt|ω<t) −→ 0 for any xt rapid w.p.1 for t→∞
The number of times, M deviates from µ by more than ε>0 is bounded by O(K(µ)),
i.e. is proportional to the complexity of the environment, which is again reasonable.
A counting argument shows that O(K(µ)) errors for most µ are unavoidable. No
other choice for wν would lead to significantly better bounds. Again, in general
it is not possible to determine when these “errors” occur. Multi-step lookahead
convergence M(xt:nt |ω<t)−µ(xt:nt|ω<t)→0 even for unbounded lookahead nt−t≥0,
relevant for delayed sequence prediction and in reactive environments, can also be
shown.
In summary, M is an excellent sequence predictor under the only assumption
that the observed sequence is drawn from some (unknown) computable probability
distribution. No ergodicity, stationarity, or identifiability or other assumption is
required.
Universal sequential decisions. Predictions usually form the basis for decisions
and actions, which result in some profit or loss. Let ℓxtyt∈ [0,1] be the received loss
for decision yt∈Y when xt∈X turns out to be the true t
th symbol of the sequence.
The ρ-optimal strategy
yΛρt (ω<t) := argmin
yt
∑
xt
ρ(xt|ω<t)ℓxtyt
minimizes the ρ-expected loss. For instance, if we can decide among Y={sunglasses,
umbrella} and it turns out to be X = {sun,rain}, and our personal loss matrix
is ℓ=
(
0.0 0.1
1.0 0.3
)
, then Λρ takes y
Λρ
t =sunglasses if ρ(rain|ω<t)<
1/8 and an umbrella
otherwise. For X =Y and 0-1 loss ℓxy=0 for x=y and 1 else, Λρ predicts the most
likely symbol yΛρt =argmaxaρ(a|ω<t) as in Section 2.
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The cumulative µ(=true)-expected loss of Λρ for the first n symbols is
LossΛρn :=
n∑
t=1
E[ℓωtyΛρt (ω<t)] ≡
n∑
t=1
∑
x1:t
µ(x1:t)ℓxtyΛρt (x<t)
If µ is known, Λµ obviously results in the best decisions in the sense of achieving
minimal expected loss among all strategies. For the predictor ΛM based on M (and
similarly ξU), one can show
√
LossΛMn −
√
LossΛµn ≤
√
2K(µ) ln 2 +O(1) (5)
This implies that LossΛMn /Loss
Λµ
n → 1 for Loss
Λµ
n →∞, or if Loss
Λµ
∞ is finite, then
also LossΛM∞ <∞. This shows that M (via ΛM) performs also excellent from a
decision-theoretic perspective, i.e. suffers loss only slightly larger than the optimal
Λµ strategy.
One can also show that ΛM is Pareto-optimal (admissible) in the sense that every
other predictor with smaller loss than ΛM in some environment ν ∈MU must be
worse in another environment.
Universal classification and regression. The goal of classification and regression
is to infer the functional relationship f :Y →X from data {(y1,x1),...,(yn,xn)}. In
a predictive online setting one wants to “directly” infer xt from yt given (y<t,x<t)
for t=1,2,3,.... The universal induction framework has to be extended by regarding
y1:∞ as independent side-information presented in form of an oracle or extra tape
information or extra parameter. The construction has to ensure that x1:n only
depends on y1:n but is (functionally or statistically) independent of yn+1:∞.
First, we augment a monotone Turing machine with an extra input tape contain-
ing y1:∞. The Turing machine is called chronological if it does not read beyond y1:n
before x1:n has been written. Second, semimeasures ρ=µ,ν,M,ξU are extended to
ρ(x1:n|y1:∞), i.e. one semimeasure ρ(·|y1:∞) for each y1:∞ (no distribution over y is as-
sumed). Any such semimeasure must be chronological in the sense that ρ(x1:n|y1:∞)
is independent of yt for t>n, hence we can write ρ(x1:n|y1:n). In classification and
regression, ρ is typically (conditionally) i.i.d., i.e. ρ(x1:n|y1:n)=
∏n
t=1ρ(xt|yt), which is
chronological, but note that the Bayes mixture ξ is not i.i.d. One can show that the
class of lower semi-computable chronological semimeasures M
|
U={ν1(·|·),ν2(·|·),...}
is effectively enumerable.
The generalized universal a-priori semimeasure also has two equivalent defini-
tions:
M(x1:n|y1:n) :=
∑
p:U(p,y1:n)=x1:n
2−ℓ(p) =
∑
ν∈M
2−K(ν)ν(x1:n|y1:n) (6)
which is again in M
|
U . In case of |Y|=1, this reduces to (1) and (3). The bounds
(4) and (5) and others continue to hold, now for all individual y’s, i.e. M predicts
asymptotically xt from yt and (y<t,x<t) for any y, provided x is sampled from a
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computable probability measure µ(·|y1:∞). Convergence is rapid if µ is not too
complex.
Universal reinforcement learning. The generalized universal a-priori semimea-
sure (6) can be used to construct a universal reinforcement learning agent, called
AIXI. In reinforcement learning, an agent interacts with an environment in cycles
t=1,2,...,n. In cycle t, the agent chooses an action yt (e.g. a limb movement) based on
past perceptions x<t and past actions y<t. Thereafter, the agent perceives xt≡otrt,
which consists of a (regular) observation ot (e.g. a camera image) and a real-valued
reward rt. The reward may be scarce, e.g. just +1 (-1) for winning (losing) a chess
game, and 0 at all other times. Then the next cycle t+1 starts. The goal of the agent
is to maximize its expected reward over its lifetime n. Probabilistic planning deals
with the situation in which the environmental probability distribution µ(x1:n|y1:n)
is known. Reinforcement learning deals with the case of unknown µ. In universal
reinforcement learning, the unknown µ is replaced by M similarly to the prediction,
decision, and classification cases above. The universally optimal action in cycle t is
[Hut05]
yt := argmax
yt
∑
xt
...max
yn
∑
xn
[rt + ...+ rn]M(x1:n|y1:n) (7)
The expectations (Σ) and maximizations (max) over future x and y are interleaved
in chronological order to form an expectimax tree similarly to minimax decision
trees in extensive zero-sum games like chess. Optimality and universality results
similar to the prediction case exist.
Approximations and practical applications. Since K and M are only semi-
computable, they have to be approximated in practice. For instance, −logM(x)=
K(x)+O(logℓ(x)), and K(x) can and has been approximated by off-the-shelf com-
pressors like Lempel-Ziv and successfully applied to a plethora of clustering problems
[CV05]. The approximations upper-bound K(x) and e.g. for Lempel-Ziv converge
to K(x) if x is sampled from a context tree source. The Minimum Description
Length principle [Gru¨07] also attempts to approximate K(x) for stochastic x. The
Context Tree Weighting algorithm considers a relatively large subclass of MU that
can be summed over efficiently. This can and has been combined with Monte-Carlo
sampling to efficiently approximate AIXI (7) [VNHS10]. The time-bounded versions
of K and M , namely Levin complexity Kt and the speed prior S have also been
applied to various learning tasks [Gag07].
Other applications. Continuously parameterized model classes are very common
in statistics. Bayesian’s usually assume a prior density over some parameter θ∈IRd,
which works fine for many problems, but has its problems. Even for continuous
classes M, one can assign a (proper) universal prior (not density) wUθ :=2
−K(θ)>0
for computable θ (and νθ), and 0 for uncomputable ones. This effectively reducesM
to a discrete class {νθ∈M :w
U
θ >0}⊆MU which is typically dense in M. There are
various fundamental philosophical and statistical problems and paradoxes around
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(Bayesian) induction, which nicely disappear in the universal framework. For in-
stance, universal induction has no zero and no improper p(oste)rior problem, i.e.
can confirm universally quantified hypotheses, is reparametrization and represen-
tation invariant, and avoids the old-evidence and updating problem, in contrast to
most classical continuous prior densities. It even performs well in incomputable
environments, actually better than latter [Hut07].
6 Discussion and Future Directions
Universal learning is designed to work for a wide range of problems without any a-
priori knowledge. In practice we often have extra information about the problem at
hand, which could and should be used to guide the forecasting. One can incorporate
it by explicating all our prior knowledge z, and place it on an extra input tape of
our universal Turing machine U , or prefix our observation sequence x by z and use
M(zx) for prediction.
Another concern is the dependence of K and M on U . The good news is that a
change of U changes K(x) only within an additive and M(x) within a multiplica-
tive constant independent of x. This makes the theory practically immune to any
“reasonable” choice of U for large data sets x, but predictions for short sequences
(shorter than typical compiler lengths) can be arbitrary. One solution is to take
into account our (whole) scientific prior knowledge z [Hut06], and predicting the
now long string zx leads to good (less sensitive to “reasonable” U) predictions. This
is a kind of grand transfer learning scheme. It is unclear whether a more elegant
theoretical solution is possible.
Finally, the incomputability of K and M prevents a direct implementation of
Solomonoff induction. Most fundamental theories have to be approximated for prac-
tical use, sometimes systematically like polynomial time approximation algorithms
or numerical integration, and sometimes heuristically like in many AI-search prob-
lems or in non-convex optimization problems. Universal machine learning is similar,
except that its core quantities are only semi-computable. This makes them often
hard, but as described in the previous section, not impossible, to approximate.
In any case, universal induction can serve as a “gold standard” which practition-
ers can aim at. Solomonoff’s theory considers the class of all computable (stochas-
tic) models, and a universal prior inspired by Ockham and Epicurus, quantified by
Kolmogorov complexity. This lead to a universal theory of induction, prediction,
decisions, and, by including Bellman, to universal actions in reactive environments.
Future progress on the issues above (incorporating prior knowledge, getting rid of
the compiler constants, and finding better approximations) will lead to new insights
and will continually increase the number of applications.
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